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Income Earning Potential 
versus Consumptive Amenities 
in Determining Ranchland Values 
L. Allen Torell, Neil R. Rimbey, 
Octavio A. Ramirez, and Daniel W. McCollum 
The relative importance of  income earning potential versus consumptive values in 
setting ranchland prices is examined using a truncated hedonic model. The market 
value of New Mexico ranches is related to annual income earning potential and other 
ranch  characteristics including ranch size, location, elevation, terrain, and the 
amount of  deeded, public, and state  trust land on the ranch. We found ranch income 
to be a statistically important determinant of  land value, but yet a relatively small 
percentage of ranch value was explained by income earnings. Ranch location, scenic 
view, and the desirable lifestyle influenced ranch value more than ranch income. 
Key words: consumptive value, grazing fees, grazing permit value, hedonic model, 
land value, lifestyle agriculture, public land grazing, voluntary grazing permit buyout 
Introduction 
The influence of desirable quality-of-life (QOL)  attributes on the market value of ranches 
was studied by William Martin and various co-authors nearly 40 years ago (Martin, 
1966; Martin and Jeffries, 1966; Smith and Martin, 1972). Martin studied Arizona 
ranches and noted that  non-livestock ranch outputs, including tax  shelters, land appre- 
ciation, and especially the ranching lifestyle, were the most important reasons for ranch 
purchase and investment. It is now widely recognized that the desirable rural lifestyle 
and agrarian values significantly inflate the market value offarms and ranches (Gosnell 
and Travis, 2005; Blank, 2002). People want an investment they can touch, feel, and 
experience (Pope, 1987). 
Consumptive and quality-of-life influences on land value appear to have grown in 
economic importance. Recent surveys suggest that livestock production and profits are 
now only secondary in importance in the ranch purchase decision. In addition to expec- 
tations of long-term capital gains, the lifestyle and social fulfillment experienced  by ranch 
buyers from owning ranchland properties is what matters most (Liffman, Huntsinger, 
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and Forero, 2000; Gentner and Tanaka, 2002; Rowe, Bartlett, and Swanson, 2001). 
Owners of large ranches, those with a long legacy on the  land, and those most dependent 
on the  ranch for income are  concerned about profit (Rowe,  Bartlett, and Swanson, 2001). 
However, these large, traditional ranches are  declining in  number W.S. Department of 
AgricultureiEconomic Research Service (USDALERS),  20021. Gentner and Tanaka  (2002) 
found that over half of western public land ranchers depend on the ranch for no more 
than 20% of annual disposable income. 
Previous studies  have developed hedonic price models and  identified numerous ranch- 
price influencing factors (see, for example, Bastian et al., 2002; Rowan and Workman, 
1992; Sengupta and Osgood, 2003; Sunderman et al., 2000; Torell and Doll, 1991). But 
only one previous study (Pope, 1985) directly incorporated agricultural income as an 
explanatory variable and provided direct estimates of  the relative contributions of 
income earning  versus consumptive values in setting ranch prices. Pope estimated that 
in 1981, a dollar of  ranch income was capitalized into $12 of land value, implying an 
8.3% capitalization rate using the standard capitalization formula, V=  Alr. The average 
agricultural use value of the  Texas ranches studied was less than one-fourth the market 
value of the land. 
In this study, we use ranch sales data compiled by  Farm Credit Services (FCS) 
appraisers, and income appraisal data  included with each sale,  to evaluate which factors 
have influenced New Mexico ranch values. Income from crops, livestock, and  wildlife are 
considered in the analysis. Further, because grazing capacity leased from the New 
Mexico State  Land Office, Bureau of Land Management (BLM),  and U.S. Forest Service 
(FS)  is integrated into New Mexico ranches, and  transferred at  the  time of sale,  the  mar- 
ket value of these grazing permits is also evaluated. Adapting the truncated nonlinear 
hedonic model proposed by Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell (1994) for modeling non- 
negative dependent variables proved to be important, revealing significant implications 
about how ranch prices vary between relatively low-priced public land ranches and high- 
priced deeded land ranches. 
The Hedonic Model and Estimation Issues 
Let E be a vector of production and economic variables that affect annual ranch earning 
potential (i.e., A =A(E)),  and let Q be a vector of site-specific factors influencing quality- 
of-life (QOL)  values. A is assumed to be capitalized into land value at  some interest rate 
r. Certain price-influencing characteristics can be elements of both E and Q, and their 
effect on ranch price may be opposite. The observed market price of a ranch (PI will be 
the sum of productive value (V) and QOL value: 
where BA,  BQ,  and B = [BA  BQl  are parameter vectors. 
An important decision is how to define the dependent variable in the model. This is 
not trivial when ranches include public land grazing permits (BLM, FS, and state  trust 
land permits) and the ranch purchaser can graze all lands transferred with the  sale, but 
purchasers do not acquire title to the public lands.' 
We recognize that state  trust lands are not public land. We refer to FS, BLM, and New Mexico state trust land as public 
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Pope (1985),  Sunderman  et  al. (2000),  Bastian et al. (2002),  and Sengupta and Osgood 
(2003) all used dollars per deeded acre as the dependent variable in their hedonic 
models. This is adequate, if not preferred, for areas with primarily deeded lands. How- 
ever, in public land ranching areas, the price per deeded acre is misleading because a 
ranch with few deeded acres and large public and state land permits attached will have 
high prices per deeded acre when total ranch value comes from both deeded and public 
land acreages. Alternatively, the total value of the ranch has been used as  the depend- 
ent variable in some hedonic land value models (Martin and Jeffries, 1966;  Rowan and 
Workman, 1992; Spahr and Sunderman, 1995; Sunderman and Spahr, 1994). This is 
also problematic because the model coefficients now measure average responses across 
all ranch sizes, but responses are expected to be quite different with ranch size. 
Other ranch value models have defined the dependent variable to be $/brood cow, 
$/AUM, or $/Am  (Workman and  King, 1982;  Torell and Doll, 1991).  Dividing the ranch 
selling price by the number of cows, ALTMs, or AUYs to estimate a $/livestock-unit price 
tacitly assumes that all ranch value arises from livestock production. This is not consist- 
ent with the observation that western ranches have value far in excess of  expected 
discounted income. 
A previously unexplored approach, which is used in this study, defines the dependent 
variable as $/total acre ($/TAC), including in the denominator both deeded and public 
land acreages. An obvious criticism of this approach is that clear title to public and state 
trust lands is not acquired with ranch purchase. 
The market value of deeded land is  observed to be much higher than  public land. This 
is addressed by including the percentages of the ranch composed of BLM, FS, and state 
grazing lease acres (STATE) as explanatory variables in the model. Specifically,  let PD, 
PBLM,  PFs, and PsTATE  be the per acre prices of  deeded land and the three previously 
discussed types of public lands, and: 
where P(E, Q, B) is as defined in equation (11, and BBLM,  BFs, and BsTATE  are fixed per 
acre price-difference parameters. Then, by definition, the dependent variable is specified 
as: 
where #A and %A refer to the number and percentage of acres in each land type, respec- 
tively. Substituting  (2)  into (3),  gathering the common term [P(E,  Q,B)],  and recognizing 
that %AD  + %ABLM  + %AFs + %AsTATE  = 1, leads to the following conceptual model: 
An animal unit (AU) is considered to be one mature cow with calf or its equivalent. An animal unit month (AUM) is the 
amount of forage required by an AU for one month. An animal unit yearlong (AUY) is the forage requirement for an AU for 
the year. A cow unit represents one mature brood cow. 540  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
where v is the error term. The defined hedonic model is consistent with a situation in 
which ranch buyers formulate per acre bid prices depending on ranch characteristics 
and with public land acres discounted in price by B,,,,  B,,  and BsTATE.  It  may also be 
appropriate to include discounts based on the percentage of livestock carrying capacity 
located on public lands, especially when rangeland productivity between land ownership 
types is greatly different. 
The Nonnegativity Restriction 
Because land values cannot theoretically be negative, the distribution of the error term 
in equation (4) should not allow for negative dependent variable values. Xu, Mittel- 
hammer, and Torell (1994) demonstrated a procedure to truncate the dependent variable 
predictions at  zero. This proved to be most appropriate for our application. Many of the 
public land ranch prices in New Mexico are clustered within a low $10-$50/acre,  but 
none are  negative. The empirical model produced a truncation in the  dependent variable 
predictions at  about $14/acre, consistent with the observed minimum prices in the data 
set. 
The truncated model of Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell (1994) is given by: 
whereg(.) represents the empirical specification of the conceptual model [equation (4)1, 
@(.)  and @(.) are the probability and the cumulative density functions for a standard 
normal variable, and z is a truncation parameter to be estimated. The only requirement 
on g(-)  is to be a differentiable function of the explanatory variables, 
and the vector of unknown parameters, 
Because of the inclusion of the nonnegativity restriction, this model must be estimated 
using nonlinear least squares or maximum likelihood procedures. Assuming that the 
error term is independently and normally distributed, the concentrated log-likelihood 
function to be maximized for parameter estimation is: 
where ci  = Y, - H(Xi; P, z) from equation (5), and the summation is over n ranch sale 
observations. The assumption of  a constant variance will have to be released in this 
study, as described below. 
Characterization of the marginal effects of the explanatory variables is complicated 
by the inclusion of the nonnegativity restriction, as described in detail by Xu, Mittel- 
hammer, and Torell (1994). There is a functional relationship between aH(X, P,  z)/aXi 
and ag(X; p)laXi,  with the marginal impact of a change in Xi on Y, given by: Torell et al.  Ranch Income versus Ranchland Values  54  1 
where 
ax,  ax,  ' 
Note that  the  D-function [equation (€91  is  a proportionality factor rescaling the  marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables on Y. The scaling factor is applied equally to all 
explanatory variables in the  model. The closerg(X; P)/z is  to zero, the  larger ag(X, P)/aXi 
is relative to aH(X, P)IaXi. 
As noted by Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell (1994), for positive values of g(.), the 
D-function will range from 0.3634 to 1.  With the  nonnegativity restriction in  place, H(.) 
is  always positive, but it is possible forg(.) to  be negative, an  alternative not considered 
by Xu, Mittelhammer, and  Torell. This was the  case for many of the  ranch sale observa- 
tions in this study. The D-function will approach zero for relatively large negative 
values ofg(-),  implying the marginal impact of Xi on ranch value also approaches zero. 
This has  important implications in  the  current  application where ranches with increasing 
amounts of public land have decreasing sale prices. The marginal effect of improving 
range condition, adding  ranch income, or adding additional acreage will have less effect 
on a public land ranch than it will on a deeded land ranch. The diminishing marginal 
value of altering Xi for lower-priced versus higher-priced ranches is a characteristic of 
the  truncated model that  may or may not be valid, and a more flexible function that  does 
not equally scale all explanatory variables may  be most appropriate. To assess  the  valid- 
ity of the  truncated model, we considered the statistical significance of z, residual plots, 
and  comparisons of R2  values from this model and alternative nontruncated functional 
forms. 
Heteroskedasticity 
Following standard procedures, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity was tested by 
regressing the squared residuals from a constant-variance model on all explanatory 
variables, their squares,  and  cross-products. The standard  "White" test strongly rejected 
the homoskedasticity hypothesis (P  < 0.001). After all of the statistically insignificant 
variables had been excluded and their  joint insignificance was confirmed through an 
F-test, the E;  predictions from this "White regression" were used as estimates for the 
0:'s  in  equation  (6)  to  reestimate model parameters. The  White test  was  reapplied to  the 
standardized residuals from the  latter model to confirm the effectiveness of the  hetero- 
skedasticity correction. Estimation was carried out using GAUSSTM  5.0 constrained 
maximum likelihood subroutines. 
Data 
New Mexico ranch sales information was collected from a sales database maintained by 
Farm Credit Services (FCS), and included 492 sales negotiated between January 1996 
and  December 2002. FCS appraisal data sheets  include extensive information about 
the  documented sale, including financial terms of the sale; ranch location; acreage and 542  December ZOO5  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
A  Ranchsates 
NRCS Major Land Resource Areas in New  Mexico 
ggSq  A36:  NM - AZ Plateaus & Mesas (DMP) 
5  A3R &in  Juan Riwr Valley, Mesas & Plateaus (bMP) 
v/d  A39:  AZ-NIM Mountains (DMTN) 
MI:  SE A2  Basin &Range fDSD) 
A42 Southern hsertic Basins, Plains, & Mauntains (DSD) 
"//-A  AM&  Southern Rocky Mountains [DMM) 
/Jh*  A51:  Hilqh Intermtluntain Valleys (DMTN) 
A7fJ:  PEtcosCanadian Plains &Valleys [DCP)  &\v A77:  Southern High Plains (DHP) 
Figure 1. NRCS major land resource areas and location 
of study ranches 
livestock carrying capacity by land type; the value of real property such as houses, 
buildings, and major structural  improvements; and FCS appraiser estimates of income 
earning potential. The income appraisal sheet includes estimates of  annual crop and 
livestock income, wildlife income, potential rental income of facilities and housing, and 
occasionally income from surface minerals like sand, gravel, and caliche. All comparable 
sales located and documented by FCS appraisers were included regardless of FCS loan 
involvement with the sale. 
Major land resource area (MLRA) designations by the Natural Resources Conserva- 
tion Service (NRCS)  were used to evaluate differences in ranch value by area (figure 1). 
These areas vary in soils, rangeland productivity, topography, vegetation, and land 
ownership, and are used to differentiate between NRCS range sites (USDAJSoil  Conser- 
vation Service, 1981). Some MLRA areas were combined because of limited ranch sales 
data. Also shown in figure 1  is the location of the 492 ranch sales used in the analysis. 
Other characteristics, such as elevation of the ranch at  the headquarters, distance to a Torell et al.  Ranch Income versus Ranchland  Values  543 
trade center, and steepness of terrain, were estimated from the ranch location defined 
on the FCS appraisal sheets. 
Table 1  provides a detailed listing of how income and expense variables were defined 
and computed, along with other variables used in the hedonic regression model and 
analysis. It can be seen that estimated net annual livestock returns ultimately depend 
on the assigned forage leasehold value, land mix, and the  total AUY on the ranch. Total 
AUY further depends on ranch size and rangeland productivity (PROD). Historical 
grazing use of  the ranch and allowed grazing capacities from federal and state land 
agencies were considered by FCS appraisers when defining average grazing capacity of 
each ranch. For any particular ranch, FCS appraisers generally used a constant 
AUYIsection productivity across all land ownership types (i.e., deeded, BLM, FS, and 
State). Correspondingly, the average percentage of land area by land type was nearly 
identical to the average percentage of  livestock carrying capacity by land type (< 1% 
difference). 
Including wildlife income in the analysis was possible because New Mexico has a 
unique program whereby wildlife permits are  issued to landowners as  compensation for 
providing wildlife habitat on private lands. After the wildlife permits are issued, land- 
owners have the option of using the wildlife permits themselves or they may sell them. 
Estimates of allowed wildlife harvest on each ranch were determined using a database 
of New Mexico landowners with elk and antelope hunting authorizations, as  maintained 
by the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish (2005). Estimates of wildlife income 
from fishing and for game species not in the Game and Fish database were also made 
by FCS appraisers. 
Of the 492 study ranches, 125 (25%) were identified to have wildlife income-earning 
opportunities. Those ranches with annual wildlife income over $2.50 per total acre (25 
sales) were located in or near the mountainous areas of the state and had income from 
elk. Many ranches in the  northern part of the  High Plains (HP)  MLRA and in  the north- 
ern and central part of the Canadian Plains (CP) MLRA (figure 1)  had wildlife income 
ranging from $0.25 to over $2 per total acre. Antelope are common in these areas. 
Once the average livestock carrying capacity of the ranch was estimated by FCS 
appraisers and multiplied by estimated forage value, and wildlife income and other 
miscellaneous annual income had been defined, ranch expenses were subtracted to 
estimate net annual earning  potential for the ranch. Grazing fees were computed using 
the fee for the year of  the ranch sale. Ranch maintenance and management charges 
were calculated as 5% of gross returns for each category. Taxes, insurance, and other 
miscellaneous expense items were included by FCS appraisers for some of the sales, but 
expenses primarily included grazing fees and management and maintenance charges. 
The hedonic model was estimated on both a nominal- and real-price basis (CPI inflation 
adjusted to 2002 price levels). 
Empirical Model Specification 
and Hypothesis Testing 
The Empirical $TAC Model 
The empirical $TAC model was obtained by specifying the functional form and specific 
variables to be included in g(X,  P) [equation (5)l: 544  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Variable Description and Summary Statistics (sample size = 492 ranch 
sales between 1996-2002) 
Units 
of  Std. 
Meas.  Mean"  Dev.  Min.  Max.  Variable  Description 
Ranch Selling Price: 
$TOTAL  Cash equivalent total ranch selling price ($) 
excluding cattle and machinery 
$A W  $ per AUY ranch selling price, $TOTAL ITOTA W 
$TAC  $ per total acre ranch selling price including 
deeded land, and federal and state grazing 
permits, $TOTAL I TOTAC 
$DAC  $ per deeded acre ranch selling price, 
$TOTAL IDEEDAC 
Acreages and  Grazing Capacity: 
TOTAC,  Total acres (sections)  on the ranch 
TOTSECT 
acres 
DEEDAC,  Acres (sections)  of  deeded land;  Ln(DEEDSECT7 
Ln(DEEDSEC27  is the natural log of  deeded sections 
acres 
BLMAC  Acres of  Bureau of  Land Management land 
FSAC  Acres of  Forest Service land 
STATEAC  Acres of  State trust land 










%FS  FSACITOTAC * 100 
%STATE  STATEACITOTAC * 100 
$ZRR  Irrigated acreslTOTAC * 100 
TOTA  W  Total AUY on the  ranch 
PROD  Rangeland productivity, TOTA  WITOTSECT 
Annual Ranch Income and  Expenses: 
ERSAUM  Average USDA/NASS 11-state AUM  lease rate 
for cattle grazing non-irrigated rangeland during 
the  year of  the ranch sale (USDA,  Monthly 
Agricultural Prices, various issues) 
LIVETOT  Gross income from  forage lease, (ERSAUM * 0.70) 
* TOTA  W  * 12; assumes forage value is  70% of 
ERS lease rate (Bartlett et al., 2002) 
OTHERTOT  Gross income from  facility and house rental, 
surface minerals, crop sales, and CRP payments 
as defined by FCS appraisers 
AGTOT  Gross income from  agricultural enterprises, 
LIVETOT + OTHERTOT 
WZLDTOT  Gross income from hunting and wildlife-related 
activities 
GROSSZNC  Total gross ranch income,  AGTOT + WZLDTOT 
TOTALEXP  Total ranch expenses including maintenance, 
management, grazing fees, taxes, insurance, and 
other miscellaneous expenses recorded by FCS 
appraisers 
NETZNCOME  Net ranch returns, GROSSZNC -  TOTALEXP 
AGEXP  Agricultural production expenses, AGTOTI 
GROSSZNC * (TOTALEXP -  grazing fees)  t 
grazing fees 
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Table 1. Continued 
Units 
of  Std. 
Variable  Description  Meas.  Meana  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Annual Ranch Income and Expenses (cont'd.): 
WZLDEXP  Wildlife production expenses, WZLDTOTI  $  743  2,933  0  30,871 
GROSSINC * (TOTALZXP -  grazing fees) 
NETAGTAC,  Net agricultural income ($/TOTAC, $ total)  $  2.26  4.82  0.10  62.19 
NETAG  from livestock, facility rental, and crop sales, 
(AGTOT -AGE=) 
NETWZLDTAC,  Net income from wildlife ($ITOTAC),  $  0.36  1.22  0  12.66 
NETWILD  (WZLDTOT -  WZLDEXP)I TOTAC; NETWZLD is 
the total for the ranch 
NETTAC  Net total income ($ITOTAC),  NETAGTAC +  $  2.62  4.94  0.10  62.19 
NETWZLDTAC 
Miscellaneous Variables: 
HBVALUE  Appraised real property value (houses, buildings,  $000~  50.59  108.78  0  1,122 
and improvements)  ($ Total) 
HBVALTAC  Appraised real property value per total acre,  $  5.90  18.08  0  183.83 
HBVALUE I TOTAC 
ELVFT,  Elevation of ranch headquarters in feet as  no.  5,540  1,331  2,900  10,626 
Ln(ELVFT)  defined at  http:Nwww.esg.montana.edu/~; 
Ln(ELVFT) is natural log 
ROUGH  Roughness coefficient, the standard deviation  no.  3.39  5.31  0  40.60 
of  surrounding elevation values as defined at 
http://www.esg.montana.edu/gY;  flat is equal to 
zero 
DISTANCE  Road miles to a trade center, defined  no.  53  29  1  153 
approximately following the rule: "Does the town 
have a Wal-Mart?" 
POPDEN  Population density (# peopldsquare mile) of the  no.  6.13  8.07  0.38  67.19 
county where the ranch is located, as defined from 
the 2000 Census 
Dummy  Variables (1  = true, 0 = false): 
DMP, DMTN,  Dummy variables for ranch location in a 
DSD, DCP, DHP  particular MLRA (see figure 1). DCP was excluded 
from the model so all comparisons were made 
relative to this ranching area. (See table 3  for 
price statistics by area.) 
D96 to DO3  Weighted time-of-sale variables; data are for the 
period 1996-2002.  (See text for additional 
discussion.) 
Number  Percent 
1996  70  14% 
1997  85  17% 
1998  95  19% 
1999  77  16% 
2000  77  16% 
2001  53  11% 
2002  35  7% 
All Years  492  100% 
DPAG  Dummy variable when percent assured grazing  011  0.13 
(%BLM  + %FS + %STATE)  was greater than 90% 
" Mean values for economic variables are reported on a nominal-price basis. 546  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
+ PBLM%  BLM + PFs  %FS  + PsTATE%STATE. 
Definitions of variables in the model, along with other variables defining the elements 
ofE and Q, are presented in table 1. Hypothesis testing about the statistical significance 
of individual parameters and joint parameter restrictions was conducted using likeli- 
hood ratio tests. 
In the empirical model, the combined variables NETAGTAC and NETWILDTAC, 
which depend on elements of E described in the income and expense section of table 1, 
measure dollar per total acre of expected annual ranch income earning potential (A). 
The expected sign of  the corresponding parameters, P2 and P,,  is positive. If ranches 
have value only because of  the income they earn, these would be the only significant 
parameters in g(X; P), and the resulting model would be the one implied by the tradi- 
tional income capitalization formula. It  was anticipated that P,  would either be the same 
or larger than P2, implying ranch buyers obtain additional utility from wildlife and 
hunting opportunities on the ranch, and thus capitalize wildlife income into land value 
at a higher rate (i.e., at a lower capitalization rate). 
Initial analyses identified several data limitations and pointed to the need for modi- 
fication. First, alternative specifications of ranch size were included to recognize that 
per acre ranch value is expected to decrease with increasing ranch size. Larger ranches 
sell for less on a per acre basis than smaller ranches. DEEDSECT and LEASESECT 
were initially included as  separate  variables to evaluate whether ranches are discounted 
based only on increasing size of the deeded land acreage or if additional discounts are 
warranted for public land acreages. LEASESECT  was not statistically significant, sug- 
gesting ranch buyers discount ranch prices based on the percentage of the land area on 
public lands [equation (4)] but are not concerned with the overall size of grazing leases. 
The discount for deeded sections fit best as the natural log of DEEDSECT, suggesting 
the size discount decreases at  a diminishing rate. 
Residual plots indicated the model tended to over-predict the market value of ranches 
that  were almost entirely public land. A dummy variable (DPAG)  was added to shift the 
intercept when more than 90% of the ranch acres were public lands. This cutoff point 
was visually determined from residual plots. Alternative functional forms for the public 
land price discounts were explored, but the linear definition with the added DPAG 
dummy variable provided the best fit. 
The average number of animal units per section that a ranch can maintain yearlong 
is a  measure of  productivity  affecting annual ranch returns and land value. 
Additionally, a more productive ranch may have value beyond added annual earnings 
if ranch buyers desire vegetative cover, plant diversity, and greenness on the ranch. 
Higher rangeland productivity may also be an indication of past good management 
and stewardship. The PROD variable measures this additional source of value with P,, Torell et al.  Ranch Income versus Ranchland Values  547 
expected to be positive, or zero if enhanced rangeland productivity is valued only for 
added ranch income. 
Only 28 of the  ranches included irrigated cropland, and another 16  produced crops on 
dryland acreages. The percentage of the land area in crops and pasture was explored as 
a potential explanatory variable. It  was determined that having relatively productive 
tillable acreages did increase the value of the ranch because of the additional livestock 
carrying capacity and crop sales, but there were no additional price influences because 
some of the land was tillable. 
Dummy variables were included to evaluate whether ranch selling prices differed by 
major land resource area (MLRA) classification. The dummy variable for the Canadian 
Plains (DCP) was excluded, and thus MLRA variables measure value relative to this 
area (figure 1). 
Time of  sale was incorporated into the model using dummy variables and the pro- 
cedure of Sunderman et  al. (2000)  in which the  value of the dummy variable for the  year 
of sale is computed as the proportion of the year that remains after the sale date, while 
the dummy variable for the following year is one minus that proportion. The dummy 
variables for all other years were set to zero. As noted by Sunderman et al., while this 
approach allows the rate of  change in ranch values to be different through time, it 
provides for a sale price continuum rather than a step function. All  sales occurred 
between January 1,1996  and December 31,2002. DO3 was excluded so that  the dummy 
variable coefficients shift the intercept relative to the January 2003 endpoint. 
Empirical Results 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter estimates for the ranch value models estimated on both a real- and nominal- 
price basis are  presented in table 2. With the exception of some date-of-sale and location 
dummy variables, all parameters  were significant at  the 90%  confidence  level or higher. 
The nonnegativity parameter (z) was highly significant in both the nominal- and real- 
price models (P  c 0.0001), and the predictive power of  the model was greatly improved 
with inclusion of  the nonnegativity truncation. 
The R2  for both the real- and nominal-price models was above 93%. The R2 of  a 
similar real-price model but without the  nonnegativity truncation (i.e., z = 0, not shown) 
was 79%, and the root mean squared error of  the model was reduced from $68/TAC 
without the truncation to $53/TAC with the truncation. Similarly, the  R2  for alternative 
models formulated as traditional linear and log-log models (not shown) dropped by over 
14%, to 79% and 75%, respectively. The nontruncated models also inappropriately 
predicted negative land values in some cases, especially for relatively low-priced public 
land ranches. 
As noted by Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell (1994), the importance of the truncation 
increases for lower-priced ranches. Measuring the dependent variable on a dollar per 
total acre basis likely increased the importance of  the truncation relative to other 
models estimated on a $/deeded acre or $/livestock  unit basis. Others have not found the 
truncation parameter to be statistically significant (Faux  and Perry, 1999),  or they were 
not able to obtain solutions to the complex nonlinear model (Perry and Robison, 2001). 548  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Ranch  Value Model Parameter Estimates (dependent variable = $/TAC 
Ranch Selling Price) 
Real-Price Model  Nominal-Price Model 
Parameter  Likelihood-  Parameter  Likelihood- 



























R  =  0.93 
n  =  492 
Mean of Dependent Variable  =  138 
Root Mean Squared Error  =  52.65 
Log Likelihood  =  -2,206 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*) denote coefficients are statistically different  from zero at  the 5%, 1%, 
and 0.1% levels, respectively. The R2  was computed as the squared coefficient of correlation between the actual Y, 
and the predicted Y,. 
The White tests applied to the final models did not reject the null hypothesis of homo- 
skedasticity (P  = 0.50 for the real-price model and P  = 0.99 for the nominal-price model). 
All estimated parameters bear the expected signs, though the sign for ranch elevation, 
roughness, and population density were uncertain a priori. The positive parameter 
estimates for Ln(ELVFT) and ROUGH are contrary to what would be expected if live- 
stock production were the primary reason for ranch ownership, but consistent with the 
hypothesis that ranch buyers assign a high value to recreation and scenic amenities. Torell et al.  Ranch Income versus Ranchland  Values  549 
Spatial correlation has been noted as a potential problem with hedonic land value 
models (Irwin, 2002), with the effect being a loss of efficiency and a bias in the standard 
errors. Because of  the complexity of  the hedonic model, we did not formally test for 
spatial correlation of  the errors. Residual plots indicated that the regression models 
predicted equally well for all ranch sizes, leased land percentages, and for all years and 
NRCS major land resource areas (MLMs).  Standard errors could increase substantially 
and one would still reach the same statistical conclusions  for important variables in the 
model. 
The public land discount parameters P,,,,  P,,  and PsTATE  were statistically different 
from one another (P  = 0.01)  based on the likelihood-ratio test. Further analysis indicated 
the acreage discount for BLM and FS  was not different (P  = 0.79), while the discount for 
STATE trust lands was statistically less than BLM (P  = 0.007), but not FS (P  = 0.13). 
Average livestock carrying capacity is less on Forest Service land in New Mexico when 
compared to all other land types (Stuckey and Henderson, 1969). Grazing fees on New 
Mexico state trust lands are currently about 2.7 times greater than the federal grazing 
fee. These productivity and cost differences affect ranch value and further differentiate 
grazing permit values through differentials in income earning potential, though these 
value differences are minimal with the relatively small parameter estimate for ranch 
income (table 2). 
Marginal Price Effects 
As noted above, the changing value of  the D-function means the marginal impact of 
changes in explanatory variables will be different depending on ranch-specific  character- 
istics. Consider the relative frequency of the values taken by the  D-function in the sample 
and what this implies about marginal changes in land value. Figure 2, panel A shows 
the strong correlation between D-function values and the $/TAC selling price of  the 
ranch. Panel B shows a similarly strong but inverse correlation between D-function 
values and the percentage of the ranch acreage on public and state trust lands. The 
cumulative distribution of D-function values is presented in panel C. 
Several parameter estimates seem illogical  until the changingvalue of the  D-function 
is recognized. The estimated parameter for house and building value (p,  = 6.01) seems 
exceptionally high. Rather, this coefficient would be anticipated to be near 1,  implying 
that a dollar of  structures and improvements adds about a dollar to the value of  the 
ranch. The marginal effect of increasing ~~~mwill  be $1  or less when the D-function 
is 0.16 or less [equation (7)l. As shown in figure 2, this was the case for 90% of  the 
ranches studied. 
The coefficient associated with DPAG (-3,053) also appears exceptionally large until 
it is recognized that the public land ranches where this adjustment applies are rela- 
tively low valued and have D-function values ranging from 0.002 to 0.004. The marginal 
effect of moving a ranch to over 90% public or state land, all other things equal, is to 
decrease its selling price by $6 to $12 per total acre. 
Ranch Location 
Topography, elevation, and vegetative characteristics vary greatly across New Mexico, 
and the MLM  classification of the NRCS (figure 1)  attempts to capture these differences. 550  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Panel A 
Sale Price ($/TAC) 
Panel B 
1  .oo 
Percent of Acreage on Public and State Land 
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Table 3. Average D-Function  Value and Average $ITAC Real 2002 Ranch Selling 
Prices by Ranching Area 
D-Function  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Ranching Area  Value  n  ($9  ($9  ($9  ($3 
Canadian Plains (DCP)  0.090  210  128  102  12  852 
High Plains (DHP)  0.072  97  128  62  3 1  300 
Mountains (DMTN)  0.258  39  268  282  5  850 
Southern Deserts (DSD)  0.027  64  50  74  9  565 
Mesas & Plateaus (DMP)  0.082  82  119  139  9  887 
All Areas  0.090  492  128  133  5  887 
Elevation and roughness are obviously higher in the mountains. The most productive 
rangelands are on the plains of  northeastern New Mexico (Stuckey and Henderson, 
19691, and the highest percentage of  leased public lands is for BLM ranches in the 
southern deserts  and  FS  ranches in the  mountainous areas. These differences explained 
much of  the regional variation in ranch sale price (table 3). Consistent with desired 
amenity values of greenness and scenic views, the dummy variable for location in the 
mountains was statically significant (P  = 0.0002). The average D-function value when 
ranches were located in the mountains was 0.258, which by equation (7) reduces the 
average marginal impact of the mountain location to $122/acre ($468 x 0.258). Ranch 
location on the flat windswept High Plains reduced average real ranch selling price by 
about $25/acre (-$348  x 0.072) relative to ranches located in the adjacent Canadian 
Plains area. 
Ranch Income 
Total ranch value is estimated by multiplying the predicted acre price by the total acres 
on the  ranch. The marginal change in total ranch price from adding agricultural income 
is then estimated as D(.)~,METAG, so ll(~(.)P,)  provides an estimate of the implied 
capitalization rate. The parameter estimate for P,  in the  real-price model ($25) suggests 
a minimum capitalization rate of about 4% for high-valued ranches where D(-)  is close 
to one. The implied capitalization rate increases as the D-function value decreases. 
To explore how livestock income influenced ranchland value, and to estimate the 
market value of  public land grazing permits, we consider a 20-section desert ranch in 
southern New Mexico and a mountain ranch of  similar size in western New Mexico. 
Average rangeland productivity was defined differently depending on ranch location and 
land type (table 4). Assumed differences in rangeland productivity between land types 
were defined from regional averages reported in the ranch sales database and by 
Stuckey and Henderson (1969). January 2003 market values are reported. 
Ranch value estimates were obtained by changing the relative amounts of  public 
versus deeded land in  the  real-price model while holding rangeland productivity for each 
land type constant at the levels shown in table 4. Average rangeland productivity was 
held constant by changing the total number of AUY on the ranch, and because deeded 
land acreages were defined to have higher average rangeland productivity, the total 
number of AUY increased with increasing amounts of  deeded land. The part of  ranch 
value attributed to livestock production was estimated by noting how ranch value was 552  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 4. Baseline Conditions for Representative BLM  and FS Ranches 
(January 2003 market values) 
Southern Desert  High Mountain 
Model Parameter  Units  Ranch  Ranch 
Ranch Size 
Deeded Land Productivity 
State Trust Land 
BLM Land 
FS  Land 
Acres of State  Trust Landa 
House and Building Value 
Roughness Coefficient 
Ranch Headquarters Elevation 
Approximate Location 




































"Acreage on state land remained constant. Acreage allocation among deeded, BLM, and FS varied. 
reduced when all AUY on the ranch were removed from the model. The analysis was 
performed using a spreadsheet, and the interested reader is referred to the RANVAL 
website for program access (Torell,  Rimbey, and Ramirez, 2005). The data and statistical 
programs used in the analysis are also available at the site. 
As shown in figure 3, when the model ranches were defined to have 95% of acreage 
on public lands (20%  state, 75% federal), the estimated January  2003 market value was 
similar at $0.33 million ($26/TAC) for the desert ranch and $0.34 million ($27/TAC) for 
the mountain ranch. Of this amount only about 4% of ranch value was explained by 
livestock income earning  potential. The estimated January 2003 ranch value increased 
to $1.38 million ($108/TAC)  for the desert ranch and to $2.06 million ($161/TAC)  for the 
mountain ranch when leased state and federal land was reduced to only 25% of the land 
base. Agricultural earnings explained 28% of the ranch market value for the high- 
mountain deeded land ranch. 
Wildlife Income 
A dollar of wildlife income added significantly more to ranchland value then did a dollar 
of agricultural income (P  = 0.008). The hunting and recreation experience is the appar- 
ent reason for this finding. 
A ranch authorized with a landowner bull elk permit that is marketable at $5,000 
annually could expect the total value of the ranch to increase by D(.)~,ANETWILD, or 
D(.) x 62 x 5,000. Consider the 39 study ranches located in the mountainous areas of the 
state. Fifteen of these ranches did not have wildlife income, and the estimated average 
D-function value for these ranches was 0.050. In contrast, 24 of the mountain ranches 
had wildlife income averaging $3.87/TAC, and the estimated average D-function 
value for these ranches was 0.388. Evaluated at  this average, the marginal land value Torell et al.  Ranch Income versus Ranchland Values  553 
I  Southern Desert Ranch  I  High Mountain  Ranch  1 
Notes: Ranch characteristics are defined in table 4. State land was held constant at four 
sections, or 20% of acreage. Total AUY was adjusted to maintain the defined rangeland 
productivity by land type. 
Figure 3. Predicted January 2003 ranch value and percentage of 
value attributed to livestock production with varying amounts 
of public land 
contribution of a $5,000 bull elk permit is estimated to be $120,280. This suggests an 
approximate 4% capitalization rate. But, when the elk permit is added to a lower-priced 
ranch with a lower D-function value, the implied capitalization rate is greatly increased 
and the land-value impact is reduced. 
Grazing Permit Value 
The contribution of federal and state land grazing permits to ranch value is  of continued 
interest with the ongoing debate about the management of public lands. Recent pro- 
posals by environmental groups are to use public funds to pay ranchers $175/AUM for 
grazing permits as a way to eliminate grazing on public lands. The contention is that 
this is a lucrative offer given that the average market value of these permits is only $35 
to $75/AUM (National Public Lands Grazing Campaign, 2005). 
The marginal value of grazing permits can be computed by recognizing that the total 
value of the ranch is  the estimated per acre value times total acreage. It  matters whether 
public land grazing capacity or grazing capacity plus leased acreage is altered. Consider 
first the situation where ranch acreage is not changed, but the allowed grazing capacity 
of the federal allotment is reduced by 1  AUY (or 12 AUMs). Starting with equation (7) 
and  following the  variable definitions in table 1,  the marginal impact on per acre ranch- 
land value is given by: 
When multiplied by total acres, the marginal change in total ranch value is: 
where it is noted that aPRODIaFEDA W = a [640  x TOTAWITOTAC]  IaFEDA W  = 
640lTOTAC. Altering grazing capacity on other land types is similarly computed. 554  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Estimates of D(.), p,,  and p,,  in equation (10) are positive, such that decreasing the 
number of AUY on federal allotments will decrease the market value of the ranch. As 
shown in panel A of figure 4, adding the grazing capacity from a section of  rangeland 
increased the market value of the desert ranch by as  much as  $30,308 ($47ladded acre) 
if the initial ranch was defined to be 100% deeded land. If the ranch was at the other 
extreme with no deeded land, the grazing value of an  added section was approximately 
$728 ($1.14/added acre). The DPAG dummy variable shifts ranch value down for 
ranches exceeding 90% public land, and there is a discontinuous break at this point. 
Because grazing capacity was defined to be similar between land classes for the desert 
ranch (table 4), the grazing contribution was similar between land types. 
A similar pattern of value arises for the mountain ranch, but because AUYlsection 
carrying capacity was defined to be substantially less for FS land (table 41, the change 
in land value per section from reduced grazing was less for FS land versus state and 
deeded land. On a $/AUM basis, the capitalized grazing value of public lands (figure 4, 
panel A) on high percentage public land ranches was considerably less than the $1751 
AUM proposed buyout payment for removing grazing on these lands. 
Reduced grazing capacity is estimated to reduce land values. It does not necessarily 
follow, however, that removing grazing capacity plus public land acreages will decrease 
the total value of  the ranch. The marginal change in total ranch value from altering 
leased land acreages (we consider BLM here) is given by: 
a$ToTAL = H(X; P,  r)  +  aH(x; P,  '1  To,,, 
SBLMAC  SBLMAC 
where 
SH(X;  P, r!  = ,,.)(p  SNETAGTAC  SNETWILDTAC 
SBLMAC  SBLMAC  '  p3  SBLMAC 
SHBVALTAC  SPROD  SDPAG 
'  p4  SBLMAC  '  'lo  SBLMAC 
+
  SBLMAC 
S%BLM  S%STATE 
+
 
SBLMAC '  psT~T~  SBLMAC 
+
 Prs SBLMAC 
As indicated by the derivative, the marginal value of the grazing permit depends on all 
factors that determine ranchland value plus how the land mix and net ranch income is 
altered as permit acreage changes. 
Consider first the marginal value of  deeded rangeland. As shown in figure 4 (panel 
B), with the desert ranch, removing a section of  deeded rangeland from a 20-section 
ranch that is 100% deeded decreased ranch value by an estimated $163/acre removed. 
Of the total value contribution, $47lacre (29%  of total value) was from the livestock sup- 
ported on the acreage (panel A). For the similar 100%  deeded mountain ranch, deeded 
lands contributed $50llacre, with income earning potential from the land contributing 
$19llacre of that value (38%).  Because deeded lands are not discounted in the model, 
adding deeded land acres necessarily increases ranch value, but the marginal con- 
tributory value decreases as the initial land base of the ranch includes more and more 
public land. Two contrary effects are important. In equation (ll),  added agricultural 
and wildlife income, and added rangeland productivity, necessarily increases ranch Torell et al.  Ranch Income versus Ranchland Values  555 
Panel A: Grazing Value 
I  Panel B: Grazing Value + Acreage Value ($/Acre)  I 
0  20  40  60  80  100  0  20  40  60  80  100 
I  Panel C: Grazing Value + Acreage Value ($/AUM) 
% Deeded Land  % Deeded Land 
Figure 4. Marginal change in ranch value from altering grazing 
capacity and grazing capacity plus land acreage on desert and 
mountain ranches with different initial amounts of deeded and 
leased public land 
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value.3 However, because public lands are discounted, the negative discount for public 
land acreages may more than offset the positive income value. This is  especially true  for 
high-priced deeded land ranches where the D-function value is relatively high. 
Consider now the case where the desert ranch was defined to have 25% BLM land, 
20% state trust land, and 55% deeded land. The estimated January 2003 market value 
of this ranch was $0.90 million (figure 3). Removing grazing from a BLM section on the 
ranch decreased capitalized grazing value by $5,240 ($8.19lacre), but estimated total 
ranch value increased by $11,426 ($17.85lacre removed) when the public land acreage 
was also removed. As observed from figure 4 (panel  B), grazing capacity plus acreage on 
BLM or FS land added about $20-$25lacre  to ranch value when ranches were defined 
to initially have no more than 30% deeded land. The grazing income portion of value was 
less than $31acre (panel A). It is the public land acreage that contributes the majority 
of  land value. 
On an  AUM basis (figure 4, panel C), the BLM acreage and grazing capacity contrib- 
uted about $130lAUM to ranchland value for high percentage public land ranches. The 
similar value was over $2OOlAUM for the  FS permit. With similar  per acre contributions 
for BLM and FS lands (panel  B), the higher AUM value for FS  is because of the  assumed 
lower grazing capacity (i.e., dividing by less AUMs) on the FS allotment. The total con- 
tributory value of the grazing permits (acreage  +grazing capacity)  is at  or below the $1751 
AUM buyout offer (panel C), depending on the amount of deeded land initially included. 
For the  most part,  New Mexico ranches are  contiguous with yearlong grazing of differ- 
ent types of land scattered throughout the ranch. The conclusion that both public and 
deeded lands add land area, making the ranch bigger, and that this adds the majority 
of ranchland value, is logical with this land use pattern. Consistent with this finding of 
"bigger is better,"  Sunderman and Spahr (1994) found deeded acres add value to 
Wyoming ranches even when they do not result in an  increase in the  forage productivity 
of  the ranch. They did not consider the contributory value of  public land acres, only 
public land AUMs. 
Estimated ranch value decreased with the  addition of BLM land when the  initial ranch 
was greater than 50% deeded land (figure 4, panel B). This point of negative value 
occurred with an  approximate 40% deeded base for the FS ranch and 75% deeded base for 
state  permits. Sunderman and Spahr (1994)  similarly concluded that  BLM and FS permits 
in Wyoming diminish ranch price when a small amount of public land is included on the 
ranch. There are a number of reasons why adding public land to a high percentage deeded 
land ranch might decrease value. The bureaucratic red tape and hassle of dealing with 
land agencies,  environmental rules and regulations, and anti-grazing activists is  a growing 
concern and expense for public land ranchers. The lack of  control and the inability to 
stop outsiders from entering the ranch is another obvious reason. 
Grazing Fees 
Grazing fees affect net ranch income, and the change in land value as  grazing fees 
increase depends on the  degree to which annual livestock income influences land values. 
'  If ranch income has a minimal effect on ranchland value, as we estimate it does, land values could go down as grazing 
capacity on public land increases. This could occur if the model has additional price discounts related to the percentage of 
grazing capacity on public lands. Our model included a discount only for the percentage of acreage on public lands because 
these percentages were nearly identically defined in the data set. Torell et al.  Ranch Income versus Ranchland Values  557 
This change can be estimated as P,D(.)AFEE. In the sample, D-function values ranged 
from about 0.002 to 0.2 for ranches with federal and state land (figure 2). The realized 
range of land value reduction from a $l/AUM grazing fee increase would be a minimal 
amount-from  about $5/AUM to zero. Whenever significant increases in grazing  fees are 
proposed, one of the arguments against the fee increase is that ranchland values will 
greatly diminish [see, for example, comments to land use reforms proposed under 
Rangeland Reform '94 (U.S. Department of the  InteriorNSDA, 1995,  p. 128)l.  Yet, when 
variation in ranch income explains very little of the variation in ranchland value, how 
can this be the case? 
We estimated a net average 2002 forage value of $7.83/AUM based on average ERS 
reported lease rates (USDALNational  Agricultural Statistics Service).  Total fee and non- 
fee grazing costs above this amount would mean a negative net income from the public 
land acreage. However, because such a small percentage of ranch value depends on ranch 
earning potential, it does not imply a negative market value for the grazing permit. 
Following the procedure of Torell and Doll (1991) and Sunderman and Spahr (1994)  for 
computing the grazing fee that forces permit value to zero is a fruitless exercise when 
ranchland value does not depend on ranch earnings. Grazing permit value is not deter- 
mined exclusively by livestock production value as traditionally stated (Roberts, 1963). 
While it  is certainly possible that a major increase in grazing fees will alter the mindset 
of ranch buyers and diminish their willingness to pay for public land grazing permits, 
under the  current fee structure the linkage among ranch income, grazing fees, and land 
value is minimal. 
Land Appreciation 
Using the  RANVAL spreadsheet  for calculation (Torell,  Rimbey, and Ramirez, 20051, the 
estimated real-price value of  the 95% public land desert ranch increased from about 
$0.328 million in January 1996 to $0.339 million by April 2002. This suggests a nearly 
constant real value with an estimated appreciation rate of about 0.5% per year. Torell 
et al. (2001) reported a declining real value for grazing permits over the earlier 1966 to 
1996 period. 
Martin and Jeffries (1966) concluded that the major reason for inflated ranch prices 
must be consumptive-related outputs, and we agree for public land leases, given their 
minimal value appreciation and the  minimal contribution of ranch income to ranchland 
value. Public land leases allow the purchase of a bigger ranch, and because the price is 
less, some individuals who can only afford a relatively low-priced ranch can enter the 
ranching business and live the desired lifestyle. 
The estimated rate of land appreciation increased with successive increases in the 
percentage of deeded land on the ranch. Over the January 1996-December 2002 study 
period, most of  the value increase occurred during 1997 and 2000. Peak values were 
estimated during  January 2001. The desert ranch with 75% deeded land was estimated 
to increase in real value by about 2% per year from January 1996 through April 2002. 
Scenic deeded mountain ranches with wildlife income appreciated in value by 8%  to 9% 
per annum on a nominal-price basis and by 4% to 5% on a real-price basis. An obvious 
implication is that high-priced deeded ranches are a better buy. Land speculation may 
be the most important reason for purchase of these ranches. 558  December ZOO5  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Numerous policy and rural development implications arise when consumptive values 
are associated with rural land ownership. Over 30 years ago, Smith and Martin (1972) 
noted that, based  on livestock production value, most range improvements show a 
negative benefitlcost ratio, and that  rates of return from livestock operations are  low by 
any standard investment criteria. Rates of  return on nonfarm assets now dominate 
investment returns from agricultural assets (excluding land appreciation), producing 
both a higher rate of return and lower risk (Erickson, Moss, and Mishra, 2004). 
Our results indicate that the capital gains component of  ranch returns and the 
marginal benefit from range improvement vary with ranch characteristics. High-valued 
ranches are  more responsive to altered ranch income and improvement. This conclusion 
about differentials in appreciation rates and marginal changes for high-priced versus 
low-priced ranches is an area of potential concern and need for further research. The 
truncated model suggests that  marginal impacts are  rescaled based on the  market value 
of the ranch and that the scaling is applied equally to all Xi.  While the truncated model 
fit the data substantially better than other traditional formulations of the hedonic 
model, a more flexible functional form that allows variation in the scaling factor may be 
more appropriate. It is also uncertain how broadly the results of  this study would 
appropriately apply. The marginal contribution of agricultural income may be consider- 
ably different for seasonal leases in northern states, though research in Wyoming by 
Sunderman and Spahr (1994) supports the "bigger is better" finding of this investiga- 
tion. Deeded Wyoming rangeland added ranchland value even without added livestock 
grazing capacity. 
Smith and Martin (1972) concluded that economic models attempting to explain 
rancher behavior based only on the profit motive are inadequate and will lead to ill- 
conceived land-use policies and policy assessments. This statement is likely even more 
relevant today. We found ranch values vary significantly and consistently, with high 
value placed on ranch location in the mountains and with recreational opportunities. A 
statistically significant but yet relatively small amount of variation in ranchland value 
was explained by variation in ranch income-earning potential. Ranch buyers maximize 
utility, not profit. Land-use policy development and implementation requires a great 
deal more than is offered by traditional cost-and-return studies related only to the most 
obvious livestock product. 
When consumptive outputs from ranches are considered, the answers to some policy 
questions are  obvious, at  least in hindsight. Consider as an  example the 1992 Incentive- 
Based Grazing Fee Study (US.  Department of the InteriorNSDA, 1993).  In  this study, 
it  was anticipated that the willingness to pay for public land forage would be consistent 
with the traditional profit-maximization model. Fee and non-fee grazing cost data  were 
gathered from western ranchers leasing both public and private forage. It  was assumed 
the estimated difference in grazing costs (implied forage value) would be high enough 
that BLM and FS could devise incentives to compensate ranchers who were managing 
and improving public lands to the agencies' satisfaction. Contrary to expectations, con- 
sidering the existing grazing fee and other non-fee grazing costs, BLM and FS permit 
holders were found to pay more on average than those leasing private forage. Public 
land ranchers could justifiably argue that they could not afford to pay higher grazing 
fees, largely because they had paid too much for the public land ranch. ~ifest~le Torell et al.  Ranch Income versus Ranchland Values  559 
amenities explain the apparent inconsistency in the study results. Consistent with the 
findings of Blank (2002), western ranching has been both a way of life and a business, 
but it is now a business only to some. 
[Received July 2004;Jinal revision received October 2005.1 
References 
Bartlett, E. T., L. A. Torell, N. R. Rimbey, L. W. Van Tassell, and D. W.  McCollum. "Valuing Grazing 
Use on Public Lands." J. Range Mgmt. 55(2002):426438. 
Bastian, C. T., D. M. McLeod, M. J. Germino, W. A. Reiners, and B. J.  Blasko. "Environmental Ameni- 
ties and  Agricultural Land Values: A Hedonic Model Using Geographic Information Systems Data." 
Ecological Econ. 40(2002):337-349. 
Blank, S. C. "Is Agriculture a Way of Life' or a Business?-Farm  Bill Choices 02.''  Choices (Summer 
2002):26-30. 
Erickson, K W., C. B. Moss, and A.  K. Mishra. "Rates of Return in the Farm and Non-farm Sectors: 
How Do They Compare?" J.  Agr. and Appl. Econ. 36(2004):789-795. 
Faux, J., and G. M. Perry. "Estimating Irrigation Water Value Using Hedonic Price Analysis: A Case 
Study in Malheur County, Oregon." Land Econ. 75(1999):440452. 
Gentner, B. G., and J. A.  Tanaka. "Classifying Federal Public Land Grazing Permittees." J. Range 
Mgmt. 55(2002):2-11. 
Gosnell, H., and  W. R. Travis. "Ranchland Ownership Dynamics in  the Rocky Mountain West." Range- 
land Ecology and Mgmt. 58(2005):191-198. 
Irwin, E. G. "The Effects of Open Space on Residential Property Values." Land Econ. 78(2002):465480. 
Liffinan, R. H., L. Huntsinger, and L. C. Forero. "To Ranch or Not to Ranch: Home on the Urban 
Range." J. Range Mgmt. 53(2000):362-370. 
Martin, W.  E. "Relating Ranch Prices and Grazing Permit Values to Ranch Productivity." J. Range 
Mgmt. 19(1966):248-252. 
Martin, W.  E., and G. L. Jeffries. "Relating Ranch Prices and Grazing Permit Values to Ranch Produc- 
tivity." J. Farm Econ. 48(1966):233-242. 
National Public Lands Grazing Campaign (NPLGC).  "NPLGC Voluntary Federal Grazing Permit Buy- 
out Proposal."  Online.  Available at http://www.publiclandsranching.orghtmlres/pb_great_deal- 
enhanced.htm. [Retrieved May 2005.1 
New Mexico Department of Game and Fish. "Landowner List for Elk and Landowner List for ANT." 
Online. Available at  http://www.wildlife.state.nm.us/recreatioting/index.htm. [Retrieved  May 
2005.1 
Perry, G. M., and L. J. Robison. "Evaluating the Influence of Personal Relationships on Land Sale 
Prices: A Case Study in Oregon." Land Econ. 77(2001):385-398. 
Pope, C. A. "Agricultural Productive and Consumptive Use Components of Rural Land Values." Amer. 
J. Agr. Econ. 67(1985):81-86. 
.  "More Than  Economics Influences the  Allocation of Rangeland Resources." Choices (4th Quarter 
1987):24-25. 
Roberts, N. K.  "Economic Foundations for Grazing Use Fees on Public Lands." J.  Farm Econ. 45(1963): 
721-731. 
Rowan, R. C., and J. P. Workman. "Factors Affecting Utah Ranch Prices." J. Range Mgmt. 45(1992): 
263-266. 
Rowe, H. I., E. T. Bartlett, and L. E. Swanson, Jr. "Ranching Motivations in Two Colorado Counties." 
J. Range Mgmt. 53(2001):314-321. 
Sengupta, S., and D. E. Osgood. "The Value of Remoteness: A Hedonic Estimation of Ranchette Prices." 
Ecological Econ. 44(2003):91-103. 
Smith,  A. H., and  W. E. Martin. "Socioeconomic  Behavior of Cattle  Ranchers with Implications for Rural 
Community Development in the West." Amer. J.  Agr. Econ. 54(1972):217-225. 560  December ZOO5  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Spahr,  R. W., and M. A. Sunderman. "Additional Evidence on the Homogeneity of the Value of Govern- 
ment Grazing Leases and Changing Attributes for Ranch Value." J. Real Estate Res.  lO(1995): 
601-616. 
Stuckey, H. R., and D. C. Henderson. "Grazing Capacities and Selected Factors Affecting Public Land 
Use." Res. Report No. 158, Agr. Exp. Sta., New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, 1969. 
Sunderman, M. A., and R. W.  Spahr. 'Valuation of Government Grazing Leases." J. Real Estate Res. 
9(1994):179-196. 
Sunderman, M. A., R. W. Spahr, J. W.  Birch, and R. M. Oster. "Impact of Ranch and Market Factors 
on an  Index of Agricultural Holding Period Returns." J. Real Estate Res. 19(2000):209-234. 
Torell, L. A., and J. P. Doll. "Public Land Policy and the  Value of Grazing Permits." West. J.  Agr. Econ. 
16(July 1991):174-184. 
Torell, L. A., N. R. Rimbey, and  0.  A. Ramirez. "New Mexico Ranch Values: RANVAL Ver. 6.4." Online. 
Available at  http://ranval.nmsu.edu/index.htm. [Retrieved May 2005.1 
Torell, L. A., N. R. Rimbey, J. A. Tanaka, and S. A. Bailey. "The Lack of a Profit Motive for Ranching: 
Implications for Policy Analysis." In Current Issues in  Rangeland Resource Economics: Proceedings 
of  a Symposium Sponsored by Western Coordinating Committee 55  (WCC-551,  Kona, HI, eds., L. A. 
Torell, E. T. Bartlett, and R. Larranaga. Res. Report No. 737, Agr. Exp. Sta., New Mexico State 
University, Las Cruces, 2001. Online. Available at  http://agecon.lib.umn.edu. [Retrieved  May 2005.1 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. "Where's the Beef? Small Farms Produce 
Majority of Cattle." InAgricultural Outlook, pp. 21-24.  Pub. No. AGO-297, USDAIERS, Washington, 
DC, December 2002. Online. Available at  http://usda.ma~lib.cornell.edu/reports/omic~/ 
ao-bb/2002/ao297.pdf. [Retrieved October 2005.1 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. Monthly Agricultural Prices. 
USDA/NASS, Washington, DC. Various issues. Online. Available at  http://usda.mannlib.corne11.edul 
reportslnassrlpricelpap-bW.  [Retrieved May 2005.1 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil conservation Service. "Land Resource Regions and Major Land 
Resource Areas of the  United States." USDA Handbook No. 296, USDAISCS, Washington, DC, 1981. 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM)  and U.S. Department of Agricul- 
ture,  Forest Service (FS).  "Incentive-Based Grazing Fee System for Public Rangelands Administered 
by the  Bureau of Land Management and United States  Forest Service: A Report from the Secretaries 
of Interior and Agriculture." Washington, DC, 1993. 
.  "Rangeland Reform '94--Final  Environmental Impact Statement." Washington, DC, February 
1995. 
Workman, J. P., and K H. King. 'Vtah Cattle  Ranch Prices." Report No. 43, Agr. Exp. Sta., Utah State 
University, Logan, 1982. 
Xu, F., R.  C. Mittelhammer, and L. A.  Torell. "Modeling Nonnegativity via Truncated Logistic and 
Normal Distributions: An Application to Ranch Land Price Analysis." J. Agr. and Resour. Econ. 
19(July 1994):102-114. 